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{presented by the Commission) 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Reporting period 
This report is largely concerned with the wide range of activities involved in the completion of the 
internal market. Individual annual reports could not be produced in this period because of the need 
for rapid preparation of  occupational safety and health directives and also because of a lack of staff 
in the secretariat. Since this work has now been completed and the situation has improved, the gap 
between the 1984 and 1996 annual reports may be considered to have been bridged. 
The report is based on a large corpus of documentation, in particular information from the Member 
States and the preparatory documents for proposals to the governments and Community directives. 
The main activities of the Safety and Health Commission and its Working Parties or Committees are 
described. 
The Safety and Health Commission approved the report on 25 November 1997. 
1.2  The Safety and Health Commission 
1.2.1  Origins, responsibilities, terms of  reference 
Institutionalised co-operation on safety in the extractive industries within the European Union dates 
back to  the  disastrous mine  fire  on 8 August  1956 at the  Bois du Cazier Colliery in Marcinelle 
(Belgium), in which 264 miners from various European countries were killed. In view of  the scale of 
the disaster, the High Authority of the  European Coal and Steel Community immediately called a 
conference  on  safety  in  coal  mines,  which  was  attended  by  representatives  of governments, 
employers and workers. The positive outcome led to the decisions of  6 September 1956 and 10 May 
1957 on continued safety co-operation and the establishment of the Mines Safety Commission for 
the coal-mining industry. The terms of reference and rules of procedure of  this body were approved 
by the Council on 9 July 1957. By the Council Decisions of 11  March 1965  and 27 June 1974, its 
activities were broadened to include health protection and its responsibilities extended to the whole 
of the extractive industries sector (OJ No L 185,  9.7.1974, p.  18).  The Mines Safety Commission 
has  since been officially known as  the  Safety and Health Commission for  the Mining  and Other 
Extractive Industries (abbreviated as "Safety and Health Commission" or "SHCMOEI"). Its primary 
task is to improve occupational safety and health in the extractive industries by reducing the risks 
specific to them.  It follows  various lines of approach,  including the  exchange of information and 
pooling of experience, proposals to  the  governments of the Member States and assistance to  the 
European Commission in its efforts to promote safety and health in the industries concerned. 
1.2.2  Structure, methods of  work 
Each Member State may send four representatives, of  whom two represent the government, one the 
employers and one the workers. The Safety and  Health Commission was thus the  first European 
body not  composed  solely of government  representatives.  Within  limits,  advisors  may  also  be 
appointed. 
The  government  representatives  on  the  Safety  and  Health  Commission  form  a  Restricted 
Committee, whose task is  to  maintain permanent contact among the governments of the  Member 
States and between the governments and the Safety and Health Commission and to prepare the work 
of  the Safety and Health Commission.  · 
As a general rule, technical questions are dealt with by tripartite working groups. In  the past, there 
were many such "Working Parties" but, for reasons of efficiency and because of the administrative 
and flnancial  constraints, these were reduced in  1993  to  five  "Committees", which are chaired by 
1  --members of  the Restricted Committee. It has also proved useful to have specific teclmical questions 
dealt with by small ad hoc groups of experts. 
1.2.3  Secretariat 
The  secretariat of the  Safety  and Health Commission, the  Restricted Committee,  the  specialised 
Committees and the ad hoc groups is  provided by the European Commission, which has entrusted 
this  task to Directorate-General V.  The European Commission also  funds  the  Safety and Health 
Commission's activities. 
2.  THE  WORK  OF  THE  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION  AND  ITS  WORKING 
PARTIES I COMMITTEES 
2.1  Meetings, events 
The Safety and Health Commission normally met twice per year, with meetings of the Restricted 
Committee on the previous day. 
The frequency with which Working Parties and Committees met was  determined by two priority 
areas  of activity:  study  of the  complex  safety  aspects  of a  number  of major  accidents  in  the 
extractive industries (in particular explosion and fire prevention and the improvement of workforce 
protection and rescue arrangements) and input to the preparation of  Community directives. 
For these reasons, it was not generally possible for the Working Parties and Committees to meet as 
frequently as in the past. 
Two information conferences, four symposia, a workshop and a congress were organised on topical 
aspects of  safety and health in the extractive industries. 
2.2  Discussion of particular occurrences 
One of the  major tasks of the  Safety and Health Commission is to pool  experience  arising from 
particular  events.  Analysis  and  prompt  forwarding  of  such  information,  especially  to  the 
governments of the Member States, make a substantial contribution to improving safety and health 
protection. The most important of such events are major accidents, of which a number occurred in 
the period covered by this report. There were serious accidents in coal, lignite, potash and fluorspar 
mining and in offshore operations. 
These  occurrences  were  discussed  in  depth  by  the  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and  the 
appropriate  specialised Working Parties  or Committees.  The  outcome of the  deliberations  found 
expression in recommendations and information reports to the governments of the Member States 
and in Community directives (see sections 2.3 to 2.6). 
2.2.1  Hard coal mining 
As in the past, underground workings in the coal-mining industry of  the European Union accounted 
for a large proportion of  accidents. Eleven major events- mainly associated with firedamp and roof 
falls  - are  discussed  below.  Previous  knowledge  and  safety  measures  were  clearly  not  always 
adequate to ensure full control of  geological and operational conditions. 
In the first years of  the report period, the Safety and Health Commission completed its study of the 
accident at Eisden Colliery (Belgium), where seven lives had heen lost in a firedamp explosion on 
8 March  1984 (Doc.  No 3205/88).  The explosion occurred when power was restored to  a  140m 
advanced maingate heading following repairs to  electrical equipment. The auxiliary fan  had been 
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'  ' II stopped  for  a  full  two hours,  allowing  a  substantial  quantity  of firedamp  to  accumulate  in  the 
auxiliary-ventilated part of the roadway. It emerged from the comprehensive inquiry that the cause 
of ignition  was  connected  with  the  restoration  of power.  The  source  of ignition  could  not  be 
definitely established but there were indications that it might be a contactor on a slusher. The factors 
underlying the  explosion were  probably the  ventilation  conditions  and the  state of the  electrical 
apparatus. The accident resulted in additions to the national regulations and proposals for measures 
to prevent similar accidents were included in a special report (Doc. No 5147/89, section 2.3.1.4). 
An accident with even more severe consequences occurred in the  first year covered by this report. 
On 25 February 1985, a firedamp explosion occurred in a drivage with tertiary auxiliary ventilation 
at Simon Colliery in France and was followed by a coal dust explosion. Twenty-two miners were 
killed, mainly by the blast and fumes. A further 269 workers suffered various degrees of poisoning 
(Doc. No 4957/85, 5513/1/85, 5520/2/85). This accident was thoroughly discussed in the Safety and 
Health Commission and in committees of experts. The European Parliament asked the Safety and 
Health Commission to carry out a study with a view to improved safety measures. The results are set 
out in  a comprehensive report accompanied  by  recommendations  (Doc.  No 5147/89, see section 
2.3.1.4). 
On  26 June  1985, there were  two  firedamp  explosions about  14  hours  apart  in  the  underground 
workings of Schlagel &  Eisen Colliery (Germany). The first explosion killed one miner and injured 
24 more. The second explosion resulted in injuries to  four rescue brigadesmen (Doc. No 2365/86). 
The explosions occurred in a former conveyor road which was being salvaged. At the time of the 
first explosion, salvaged workings were being stopped off. The second explosion occurred during 
preparations  for  nitrogen  purging  of the  workings  affected.  It can  be  assumed that  explosive 
firedamp mixtures were present, at least in the form oflayers, in the extensive complex of  workings, 
which had been stopped off on one  side.  It is  likely that a  fire  had started through spontaneous 
combustion in  this area as  a result of mining interaction with an adjacent seam. The lessons to  be 
learnt from this accident were taken into account in Doc. No 5147/89. 
On  16 February  1986,  two  firedamp  ignitions  took  place  in  rapid  succession  near  a  face  in 
Camphausen Colliery  (Germany).  Seven  miners  were  killed,  three  as  a  result of inhaling  toxic 
explosion fumes and four as a result of mechanical and thermal injury (Doc. No 2283/86, 2286/86, 
5003/89). On the day of the accident, which was a Sunday, coal was not being mined. Workmen 
were attempting to seal the gateside pack in the tailgate in order to reduce the ingress of oxygen to 
the goaf. There were signs of  extensive oxidation in this area and it seems likely that the sources of 
ignition were also located there. Derangement of the firedamp drainage system had probably led to a 
rise in methane levels in the goaf. Once rescue operations had been completed, the panel was sealed 
off.  This event, like that at Schlagel &  Eisen,  gave rise to extensive discussion in the Safety and 
Health Commission. The outcome was reflected in the proposals to the  governments contained in 
Doc. No 5147/89. 
On 22 December 1989, there was a fire at Mosquitera Colliery (Spain). Four miners were killed and 
three  seriously  injured  by  fire  gases.  The  fire  probably  originated  at  a  conveyor  belt  (Doc. 
No 2300/90).  The  Safety  and  Health  Commission  proposed  measures  for  fire  prevention  and 
firefighting in Doc. No 5147/89. 
On  27 May  1990,  a coal  dust explosion occurred below ground  at  La  Serrana ColJiery  (Spain), 
resulting  in  three  fatalities.  Th•c  explosion  was  caused  by  shotfiring,  with  no  involvement  of 
firedamp.  Discussion  in  the  Safety  and  Health  Commission  did  not  lead  to  any  additional 
recommendations. 
On  15  April 1992, a firedamp explosion occurred at Haus Aden Colliery (Oermany) in an  auxiliary-
ventilated disused ga!eroad from which the supports were being salvaged. Seven miners died, six by 
asphyxiation at the site of the accident and one some taue later as a result of organic.failure caused 
by  severe burns.  The  explosion was  initiated about  30 m in bye of the  place  where  work was  in 
~ --progress, in  an  area  from  which the  supports had already been removed but which had not been 
adequately  filled  and in which  firedamp  had  accumulated.  Ignition was  caused by hot surfaces 
resulting from friction. This accident will probably give rise to an addition to Doc. No 5147/89 (see 
section 2.7.4). 
On I 0 December 1992, four deaths were caused by a fall of  roof on a face at Santa Barbara Colliery 
(Spain) (Doc. No 5413/94). At the time of the accident, the seam thickness was about  I m,  with a 
dip  of about 40°.  The nether roof consisted of up  to  5 m of shale overlain by massive sandstone 
beds. The floor consisted of strong shale beds. The coal was mined with a shearer and the face was 
supported on timber props bearing on wooden roof and floor members. The top gate was protected 
by two rows of  wooden chocks. Two rows of wooden chocks were also placed perpendicular to the 
face in such a way as to divide it into three sections roughly equal in length. The roof over the goaf 
was blasted down in sections to fill the void. The accident took place as work was resumed after a 
five-day break. The fallen block of shale was about 40 m in length along the  line of dip and about 
15 m wide on the accessible side and was of  tapering shape with a thickness of  2 m at the top end. It 
was bounded by slip planes but had been supported by  several stone bridges.  In response to  this 
accident, the  Safety and Health Commission took a fresh  look at principles of strata control and 
support in underground workings of  the extractive industries (see section 2.3.1.5). 
On  19  August  1993,  three  miners  were  killed  in  an  accident  at  Bilsthorpe  Colliery  (United 
Kingdom) as a result of a sudden extensive fall of  roof in a supply gate, which was being developed 
immediately adjacent to  a previous  face  ("skin  to  skin"  working)  and  was  supported by vertical 
rockbolts  with  roof straps  (Doc.  No 5037/94).  The  roadway  failure  resulted  from  very  heavy 
weighting of the support system, caused partly by the rapid rate of advance and partly by the strata 
conditions. The accident led to the recommendation that the skin to  skin method be discontinued 
until a better understanding is obtained of strata behaviour in the vicinity of old wastes. 
On 31  August 1995, 14 miners died in an accident at San Nicolas Colliery (Spain). This occurred at 
the lowest working level of a sublevel district in a seam of 3 m average thickness dipping at 72°. In 
the  western  unit,  preparatory  drivage  was  being  carried  out  by  heading  machine,  while  coal 
production had just begun  in  the  eastern unit,  where  a shotfirer was  working  at  the time of the 
accident.  Exhaust ventilation  was  practised with  electric  fans  and  a branched  duct  layout  (Doc. 
No 487/95, 488/95). At the end of 1995, the  inquiry had not yet been completed. There are strong 
indications that the  accident was  a  firedamp  explosion.  This  accident  will  probably also  lead to 
additions to documents previously produced by the Safety and Health Commission. 
On  13  October 1995, eight miners were killed at Candin Colliery (Spain). The men concerned were 
placing and strengthening a mesh barrier used  to  confine stowing material on  a mechanised face. 
Failure of  the floor over a distance corresponding to two or three support sets caused about 30 car-
loads  of stowing  dirt  to  slip  towards  the  face  line,  burying  the  workmen  (Doc.  No 496/95). 
Discussion of this accident in the Safety and Health Commission had not been completed by the end 
of  the report period. 
2.2.2  Lignite mining 
On I June 1998, a dust explosion in the Stolzenbach underground lignite mine (Germany) killed 51 
miners, of  whom six died of injuries caused by the mechanical effects of the explosion and 45 of CO 
poisoning  (Doc.  No 5903/89,  6338/89).  The  explosion  was  triggered  by  two  shots  fired  in 
succession.  Firedamp  was  not  involved.  After  the  accident,  the  mine  was  closed.  In  the  other 
underground lignite mines in  Germany, the  prescribed CO  filter  self-rescuers were  replaced with 
oxygen escape sets. 
4  --2.2.3  Potash mining 
On  19  July 1989, three miners died in the Wintershall potash mine (Germany) (Doc. No 6476/89, 
2434/90,  539/93).  During  drivage  with  a  roadheader,  a  sudden  outburst  of the  carbon  dioxide 
contained  in  the  mineral  caused  about  2000  tonnes  of salt  to  be  projected  into  the  roadway, 
engulfing the machine operator, his assistant and another miner. More stringent requirements have 
since been introduced for advance exploration of the strata when the mineral is worked by cutting 
machines. Hitherto, the normal practice has been to mine potash salts by blasting, the rounds being 
fired from the surface with the entire workforce withdrawn from the mine. 
2. 2.4  Fluorspar mining 
On 19  July 1985,  failure of the dams of two  lagoons located one above the other at the Prestavel 
fluorspar  mine  (Italy)  caused a  flood  surge  which  killed  268 persons  (Doc.  No 3162/86).  The 
inquiry established that the  stability of the  dams  was  marginal and that there  were  no  means  of 
monitoring dam stability and the effectiveness of  the filters. Even before this disaster, the Safety and 
Health  Commission  had  discussed  precautions  against  such  hazards  and  had  produced  Doc. 
No 248417/80. 
2.2.5  Offshore operations 
On 6 July 1988, a series of explosions occurred on the Piper Alpha oil production platform in the 
British  sector of the  North  Sea.  Fire broke  out  in  various  places  on  the  rig.  Despite  the  rapid 
response  of supply  ships,  one  of which  was  equipped  with  firefighting  equipment,  it  was  not 
possible to bring the various fires under control or avoid further explosions. The first explosion was 
followed 20 minutes later by a second, which was much more violent and caused a caused a large 
part of  the platform to be engulfed in flames. 
There is  no  evidence that instructions were given to  evacuate the platform.  Many of the  workers 
appear to  have remained in the accommodation. A few jumped into the water or climbed down to 
the water level and were rescued. Of  the 226 persons on board the platform, 165  died, and two more 
men were killed during rescue operations. 
The  inquiry  found  that  the  first  explosion  was  initiated  in  the  gas  compression  module.  An 
explosible gas mixture  was  apparently able  to  form  because the  production team on  the  shift in 
which the accident occurred was  unaware  of temporary repairs  which had been carried out on a 
condensate  injection pump - removal of a defective valve  and  fitting of blind flanges.  Since the 
condition of this  pump  was  not  known,  it  was  started when the working pump tripped and this 
probably caused a substantial gas leak. 
The conclusions drawn from the accident led to  the further development of safety regulations for 
offshore operations at national, European and international level. They were also taken into account 
in the Community Directive 92/91/EEC. The Committee on Borehole Operations produced a full 
report on the Piper Alpha disaster (Doc. No 302/3/95). 
2.3  Proposals for the improvement of  safety 
During  the  report  period,  the  Safety  and  Health  Commission  approved  the  following 
recommendations  and information  reports  on the  improvement  of safety.  These  were  generally 
prepared by the Working Parties or Committees responsible for the field in question. 
5  --2.3.1  Undergrowui workings 
2.3 .1.1  Eleclrical apparatus and systema 
The former W  orlcin& Party on Electricity produced the following proposals: 
- Electri<:al  apparatus  and  systems  for  use  when  the  concentration  of firedamp  exceeds  the 
slatutory limit for electrK:ity (Doc. No 6374/13/82) 
- Earth fault protection in mines underground in the countries of the European C~mullities (Doc. 
No 2306/ 18/13) 
- Choice  of types  of  protection  for  electrical  equipment  for  use  in  potentially  explosive 
atmospheres in mines susceptible to firedamp, depending on location (Doc. No 7141/7/84). 
The purpose of the first  document is  to set out conditions  under which electrical apparatus and 
systems may remain energised even if  the frredamp concentration exceeds a limit value laid down in 
the Member States. Since this involves an increased risk of  ignition, the only apparatus and systems 
which may remain in operation are those which are necessary for general safety, such as cap lamps 
and equipment for communications and signalling, ventilation monitoring, prevention of dangerous 
occurrences or reduction of  their consequences. 
The  second  document  seeks  to  prevent  hazards  resulting  from  insulation  faults  in  electrical 
apparatus.  To ensure  protection against  earth  faults,  it  is  important  that  the  metal  housings  of 
electrical  apparatus  be  earthed in  a  permanently secure  manner.  In  underground  workings,  and 
particularly in gassy mines, special measures are required to ensure good earth connections. Special 
protective devices must be used to detect dangerous insulation faults and reduce risks. 
The purpose of the third document is to lay down uniform rules for the choice of types of  protection 
according to the location of  use, so thatthe same standards of  safety obtain in all Member States and 
any barriers to trade within the Community are eliminated. 
It relates to electrical apparatus covered by a  certificate of conformity  under Council Directive 
82/130/EEC for use in potentially explosive atmospheres in mines susceptible to firedamp. 
2.3.1.2  Hydromechanical coal mining 
Doc. No 2273/7/83  on  "General conclusions in  respect of the explosion at the Hansa Hydromine 
(Germany)"  sums up the  Safety and  Health Commission's deliberations on this accident.  During 
trials ofhydromechanical coal mining, a firedamp ignition followed by a dust explosion occurred on 
22 March  1979,  killing seven miners  and  causing  slight injuries  to  one.  The information report 
covers basic principles of ventilation, installation and operation of auxiliary ventilation systems and 
monitoring. It confirms the principle that coal should be mined on a routine basis only in through 
ventilation. 
2.3 .1.3  Mine fires 
The former Working Party ori  Rescue Arrangements,  Mine Fires and Underground Combustions 
addressed two major areas in the following information reports: 
Preventing,  combatting  and  stopping  off of  fires  arising  from  spontaneous  combustion 
underground (Doc. No 6482/13/82) 
6  --- Notes on the use of inertisation for firefighting at coal mines in the European Community (Doc. 
No 4589/3/85). 
The first of these reports describes suitable measures for the prevention, early detection and fighting 
of self-heating  fires  in underground  workings  and  provides  guidance  for  colliery  management. 
Many of  the aspects considered have wide application but attention is concentrated on coal mining. 
The report states that the risk of spontaneous combustion depends on a number of geological and 
operational factors: 
The most effective precaution has proved to be sealing ofall air leakage paths. Monitoring of the 
mine atmosphere is particularly important where there is a propensity to  spontaneous combustion. 
Additional measures must be taken to supplement conventional firefighting techniques in situations 
where heatings are a known risk. A reduction in the flow of ventilating air through the area where 
the heating is located should be attempted only if  expert advice is available at the colliery. Nitrogen 
purging  is  particularly  to  be  recommended  if local  or zone  inertisation  is  possible.  It is  very 
important that  a  sufficient  number of specialists  in control  of spontaneous  combustion  fires  is 
trained at all collieries where this risk may arise. 
From the mid-1960s onwards, the use of inert gases for firefighting in mines, which is discussed in 
Doc.  No 4589/3/85,  became increasingly  important  in  the  coalmining  industries of western  and 
eastern  Europe.  Standard  methods  were  developed  and  successfully  applied.  In  view  of the 
knowledge and experience acquired in  practical use,  it was thought desirable to produce a report 
with a view to future applications. This document sets out the aims and advantages of inertisation 
and describes the various methods of  generating inert gas. The report concludes with comments on 
rescue service operations in inert gases. It  also contains a list of  major references for further reading. 
During the reference period, additions were made to the  "Sixth report on specifications and testing 
conditions relating to fire-resistant  hydraulic  fluids  used  for  power transmission (hydn;1static  and 
hydrokinetic) in mines"  (Doc. No 6206/3/89 and 2508/90;. 2584/90, 2640/90 and 2645/90). It also 
proved necessary to take environmental problems into account. There was a need to  develop new 
fluids causing as little environmental damage as possible and to devise a test method appropriate to 
their  properties.  A  new  version  of the  report  was  therefore  produced  and  published  as  Doc. 
No 4746/10/91  under the title "Requirements and tests applicable to  fire-resistant hydraulic  fluids 
used  for power transmission  and  control  (hydrostatic  and  hydrokinetic)  - Seventh Edition".  This 
document, too, contains recommendations to the governments of  the Member States. The content of 
the report is shortly to be incorporated into European standards. 
Shortly after it was set up, the Safety and Health Commission had produced the First Report on fire-
resistant fluids. The use of  such fluids can prevent the onset and propagation of mine fires and hence 
disasters such as that in Marcinelle (Belgium) in  1956. In producing requirements and tests for fire-
resistant fluids,  the Safety and Health Commission broke new ground.  There was  great interest in 
the  report  both  in  the  extractive  industries  and  other  sectors,  e.g.  the  aerospace  and  shipping 
industries. 
2.3.1.4  Explosion and fire risk in auxiliary-ventilated workings 
Immediately after the Simon Colliery disaster (see section 2.2.1) the Safety and Health Commission 
began intensive  discussions.  The areas. which had emerged as  important at the symposium on 17 
September 1985 (see section 2.7.3) were further investigated. The findings of six groups of experts 
are contained in Doc. No 5147/89 on "Measures to reduce the explosion and fire  risk in auxiliary-
ventilated workings and to improve the protection of personnel in the event of explosions and fires 
in coal mines". This is a wide-ranging report of  fundamental importance, with many proposals to the 
governments of the Member States. It takes account not only of the lessons to be learned from the 
Simon  accident  but  also  those  from  other  occurrences  involving  auxiliary  ventilation  (Doc. 
No 5520/2/85). It is divided into four parts, dealing with the safety of auxiliary ventilation, limiting 
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the dangers of  explosion, measures to improve prevention and fighting of mine fires and to improve 
protection  of personnel  in  the  event  of explosion  and  frre  and  the  role  of human  factors.  An 
extensive bibliography provides pointers to further reading. The Safety and Health Commission took 
steps  to  ensure  rapid  dissemination  of the  findings,  e.g.  by  means  of the  symposium  on 6--7 
December 1990 (see section 2.7.3). The main findings were summarised in a special document for 
the Europe111 Parliament (Doc. No 5148/89). 
2 .3 .1.5  Strata control and !IUpp<lrt 
The  occurrence  of a  number of accidents  in  underground  mines  caused  the  Safety  and  Health 
Commission to resume work on the  principles of strata control and support, taking account of the 
lessons learned from recent experience. The results of the work done in the  period covered by this 
report  are  set  out  in  Doc.  No 486/95,  consisting  of parts  I  to  III.  This  contains  general 
considerations, accompanied by specific recommendations for underground mines of  coal and other 
stratified minerals. (A supplement- Part IV- has since been produced on other mineral workings as 
Doc. No 1189/1/95.) 
2.3.2  Borehole operations 
The  former Working Party on Oil, Gas  and Other Materials Extracted by Borehole continued its 
work to align the aims and content of training programmes for oil and gas production throughout 
Europe. There is great interest in harmonisation since training of drilling professionals is expensive 
and persons working  for  international companies are  highly mobile.  The  basis  for  the  Working 
Party's approach was the generally framed documents No 6101/9/81  and 706113/84 on safety and 
health training in the onshore and offshore industries. The Working Party extended the principles set 
out in these documents with regard to well control and the use of  fire fighting equipment. It  produced 
the followinc recommendations in these areas: 
- Proposed training of drilling personnel  in the  petroleum extri!ICtive  induaft'ieii  concerning well 
control (Doc. No 7675/8/84) 
- Training for offshore woriters ift tbe 116e offirefighting equipment (Doc. Ng 761119/14). 
The  requireMC~~tl for training in  well  control are geared to straiJhtforwartl opwatiGM.  Alllditional 
training  may  be  necessary  for  specific  operations.  The  minimum  reqwiletiKIIUI  are  reflected  in 
course  programmes  for  assistant  drillers,  drillers  and  workover  operators  and  for  supervisors, 
toolpushers and workover supervisors. 
Doc.  No 7681/9/84  provides  guidance  on training  in  firefighting.  The  training  programmes  are 
geared to  the requirements of various  target groups.  All  persons present on an installation must 
receive appropriate general theoretical instruction and/or practical basic  training in fire  prevention 
and  firefighting.  Firefighting teams,  the  leaders of firefigl\ting tsams lmli  fire-prevention  officers 
must receive fuller training. 
2.4  Proposals for the improvement of health protection 
Community directives were the main moving force behind health protection proposals by the Safety 
and Health Commission to the governments of the Member States. These proposals are consistent 
with the aims pursued by the European Commission and were drawn up by the Working Party on 
Health in Mines. 
2. 4.1  Lead ores, lead ore concentrates 
The "Proposal for the protection of workers in the extractive industries against a risk to th ·i; health 
whf<:~.  may  arise  from  exposure  to  ores  containing  lead  or  lead  ore  concc  oc. 
8  --No 3032/7/83) seeks to provide workers in mining operations with similar protection to that afforded 
to workers in other industries, taking account of the special conditions obtaining in mining and ore 
preparation. Directive  82/605/EEC of 28  July  1982  on  the  protection of workers  from  the  risks 
related to exposi.rre to metallic lead and its ionic compounds at work (OJ No L 247, p. 12) does not 
apply to the mining of  lead ores and the on-site preparation of lead ore concentrates. The Safety and 
Health Commission's proposal  is  largely based on Directive  82/605/EEC,  but special provisions 
were necessary at certain points because of the  specific conditions in the  extractive industries. In 
particular, areas must be provided below ground in which workers can eat with minimum exposure 
to  lead. In addition, the airborne dust sampling methods used must yield reliable results under the 
ventilation conditions obtaining below ground. The proposal does not apply to work areas for which 
it can be proved that the lead ore is in a qualitative or quantitative condition such that no blood-lead 
level greater than 40 Jlg/100 ml occurs (time-weighted average for 40 hours per week). 
2.4.2  Fibrogenic mineral dusts 
In connection with the efforts at European level to protect workers from the effects of substances 
harmful to health, a document No 5761/17/85 was produced under the title "Proposal to reduce the 
risk to health associated with the exposure to fibrogenic mineral dust in the non-coal mining (lignite 
mining underground excluded) and quarrying industries". The proposal applies to activities of the 
non-coal mining and quarrying industries in  which workers are or may be exposed to fibrogenic 
mineral dusts. Underground lignite workings are excluded from the scope of the proposal, but not 
lignite  quarrying.  The area covered includes buildings and plant for  the  processing,  loading  and 
storage of the minerals in question, transport and storage of waste and maintenance of equipment 
and  machinery.  The  proposal  itself is  largely concerned with detecting  and  monitoring  airborne 
dusts and setting limit values. Exposure and risk assessments must be carried out for all activities in 
which fibrogenic mineral dusts may arise. The limit value for the respirable (alveolar) fraction of 
dusts with a free crystalline silica content of 1-5% by mass is 5 mg!m3  referred to 8 hours. Where 
the free crystalline silica content is higher, the limit value is to be calculated by a formula such that 
the limit is reduced as the quartz content increases. When the compensation method is used, long-
term averages  for  a one-year period  must  be  determined  for  the  individual  workers  concerned. 
Details of the  medical surveillance of dust-exposed persons are  to  be  regulated by the individual 
Member States. Care must be taken to ensure that disorders resulting from fibrogenic mineral dusts 
are detected at an early stage. Measures to prevent or reduce dust exposure are summarised in an 
appendix as a code of  good practice. 
2.4.3  Noise 
A statement in the Council  minutes concerning Directive 86/188/EEC on the protection of workers 
from  the risks related to exposure to noise  at work (see  section 2.6.1.1) required the  Safety and 
Health Commission to review arrangements for applying the Directive in the extractive industries 
and associated exploratory activity and to draw up  any recommendations that might be necessary. 
The  Safety  and  Health  Commission  concluded  that  recommendations  should  be  made  for 
underground workings. It is particularly difficult to  assess  noise exposure below ground,  mainly 
because men and machines move from place to place and there are fluctuations in machine running 
times. 
The purpose of Doc.  No 5025/7/89  "Code of good practice  for  implementing Council Directive 
86/188/EEC on the  protection of workers from  the  risks related to  exposure to noise at work in 
underground mining" is to provide specific proposals as an aid to incorporating that Directive into 
underground  mining  practice.  The  code  explains  direct  and  indirect  measurement  methods  for 
assessing workers' noise exposure when there is adequate reproducibility of the working conditions. 
A method for delimiting noise zones is also described in detail. 
9  --2.5  Preparation of draft Community directives 
A major task of the  Safety  and  Health Commission was  to  assist  the  European  Commission  in 
preparing draft directives for the improvement of occupational safety and health protection in the 
extractive industries. 
When  adopting  the  general  Workplace  Directive  89/654/EEC,  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament decided that additional specific provisions were required for the extractive industries and 
the  European Commission asked the Safety and Health Commission for  assistance. As part of the 
Safety and Health Commission's work, three directives were also drafted on the application of new 
harmonised standards to electrical equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres in mines 
susceptible to firedamp. 
2.5.1  Drafting of  the Directives 92/91/EEC and 921104/EEC 
From the outset, the  Safety and Health Commission  sought to  produce not only requirements for 
workplaces  in  the  strict  sense  but  arrangements  for  the  extractive  industries  which  were  as 
comprehensive as possible. For various reasons, the provisions could not be combined in a single 
directive for  all  sectors, as had been intended. As a result of the intensive and wide consultations 
involving a number of Working Parties, draft proposals were drawn up for two directives. The text 
which  subsequently  became  Directive  92/91/EEC  of 3 November  1992  applies  to  onshore  and 
offshore borehole operations (OJ No L 348, 28.11.1992,  p. 9). The text later enacted as Directive 
92/1 04/EEC of 3 December 1992 covers surface and underground mineral workings (OJ No L 404, 
31.12.1992, p.  10).  The proposals for  directives were  further aligned in form  and content as  they 
passed through the  competent Council  working party. The aim of combining  them  again proved 
impossible, mainly for formal reasons. 
The  foregoing  two  directives  are  the  11th  and  12th  individual  directives  within  the  meaning of 
Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC. They have the same structure and objectives and to a large 
extent the same wording. Differences arise from the specific conditions in the different sectors. The 
basic requirements are set out in about ten articles in each directive, which in both cases are fleshed 
out by  a comprehensive annex,  consisting of three  sections with common  and  special  minimum 
requirements. 
2.5.2  Adaptation of  Council Directive 821130/EEC 
During  the  period  covered  by  this  report,  drafts  were  produced  for  the  following  Commission 
directives adapting to technical progress Council Directive 82/130/EEC on the approximation of the 
laws  of the  Member  States  concerning  electrical  equipment  for  use  in  potentially  explosive 
atmospheres in mines susceptible to firedamp (OJ No L 59, 2.3.1982, p. 10): 
- Directive 88/35/EEC of2 December 1987 (OJ No L 20, 26.1.1988, p. 28) 
Directive 911269/EEC of30 April 1991  (OJ No L 134, 29.5.1991, p. 51) 
- Directive 94/44/EC of 19 September 1994 (OJ No L 248, 23.9.1994, p. 22). 
As  a result  of technical  developments,  it  was  first  of all  necessary  to  adapt  the  content of the 
harmonised technical standards and  the  provisions for  marking also had to  be brought up  to  date. 
The Restricted Committee of the  Safety and Health Commission is  responsible  for  amending the 
annexes to Directive 82/130/EEC in order to take account of  technical progress. 
10  --2.6  Opinions on draft Community directives 
The Safety and Health Commission considered many draft proposals for directives in various areas. 
After the first major revision of  the European Treaties in 1986 (the Single European Act), there was 
an appreciable  increase  in  the  number of directives  aimed  at improved occupational  safety  and 
health protection. A fresh impetus resulted from the inclusion in the EEC Treaty of Articles  118a 
and  I  OOa.  The directives relating to  products were  primarily based on Article  I  OOa  of the  EEC 
Treaty  and  were  drawn  up  on  the  basis of the  new  approach  to  technical  harmonisation  and 
standardisation. This involves setting out basic requirements in the directives in the form of general 
goals affording a high standard of  protection, which are fleshed out by harmonised standards. 
2. 6.1  Improvement of  safety and health protection 
2.6.1.1  Older directives 
In the period up to 1986/87, the Safety and Health Commission delivered opinions on the drafts for 
the following directives: 
- Directive 86/188/EEC of 12  May  1986 on the protection of workers from  the risks related to 
exposure to noise at work (OJ No L 13 7 , 24.5 .1986, p. 28) 
- Directive 88/642/EEC of 16 December 1988 amending Directive 80/1107/EEC on the protection 
of  workers from the risks related to exposure to chemical, physical and biological agents at work 
(OJ No L 356, 24.12.1988, p. 74). 
In  the  course of the  official  deliberations  on  the  first  of these  directives,  the  Council  and  the 
European Commission agreed that the Safety and Health Commission should consider how it should 
be applied in the extractive industries and draw up any recommendations which were required. The 
outcome of  these deliberations is set out in Doc. No 5025/7/89 (see section 2.4.3). After considering 
the  second  directive,  the  Safety  and  Health  Commission  produced  a  proposal  specific  to  the 
extractive industries for reduction of the health risks arising from  fibrogenic  mineral dusts (Doc. 
No 5761117/85, see section 2.4.2). 
2.6.1.2  The Framework Directive and pertinent individual directives 
Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements 
in the safety and health of  workers at work (OJ No L 183, 29.6.1989, p.  I) is central to the efforts to 
ensure high safety and health standards in the European Union. It applies in full  to  the extractive 
industries and the Safety and Health Commission therefore gave thorough consideration to the draft. 
It imposes a number of basic obligations on employers and lays down both duties  and rights for 
employees. Because of  the fundamental nature of  its requirements, it is referred to as the Framework 
Directive.  The  Council  has  since  issued  a  considerable  number  of supplementary  individual 
directives. Insofar as  these are directly relevant to  the extractive intlustries, the Safety and Health 
Commission expressed an opinion at the drafting stage. This applies in particular to the following: 
- Directive  89/655/EEC  of 30  November  1989  concerning  the  minimum  safety  and  health 
requirements for  the use of work equipment by workers at  work (second individual Directive) 
(OJ No L 393, 30.12.1989, p.  13) 
- Directive 89/656/EEC of 30 November 1989 on the minimum health and safety requirements for 
the use by workers of  personal protective equipment at the workplace (third individual directive) 
(OJ No L 393,30.12.1989, p.  18) 
11  --Directive 90/269/EEC of 29 May 1990 on the minimum health and safety requirements for the 
manual  handling of loads where there is a risk particularly of back injury to workers (fourth 
individual Directive) (OJ No L !56, 21.6.1990, p.  9) 
- Directive 90/270/EEC of  29 May 1990 on the minimum safety and health requirements for work 
with display screen equipment (fifth individual Directive) (OJ No L !56, 21.6.1 990, p. 14 
- Directive 92/58/EEC of 24 June  1992 on the minimum requirements for the provision of safety 
and/or health signs at work (ninth individual Directive) (OJ No L 245, 26.8.1992, p. 23). 
The aims pursued by the  above  instruments are clear from  their titles.  Their scope includes the 
extractive  industries.  The  second and  third individual  Directives  supplement  the  product-related 
Directives 89/392/EEC on machinery and 89/686/EEC on personal protective equipment in order to 
take  account of health  and  safety  aspects.  The  second  individual  Directive  was  amended  and 
expanded by Directive 95/63/EC of  5 December 1995 (OJ No L 335, 30.12.1995, p. 28). 
On various occasions, the  Safety and Health Commission criticised the proposal 93/C 77/12 for a 
Council  Directive  on  the  minimum  health  and  safety  requirements  regarding  the  exposure  of 
workers to the risks  arising  from  physical agents  (OJ  No C 77,  18.3.1993, p. 12). This contains 
provisions governing risks arising from noise, vibration, optical radiation and electromagnetic fields 
and waves. The Safety and Health Commission sees no reason for the Noise Directive 86/188/EEC 
to be updated since it has only recently been transposed into law in some Member States and there 
has  not yet been time  to  acquire  sufficient informative  experience.  Provisions  for  vibration are 
acceptable only if they  are  practicable. In  the present state of knowledge,  it seems premature to 
prescribe requirements for protection against optical radiation or electromagnetic fields and waves. 
Proposal 95/C 332/06 for a Council Directive on minimum requirements for improving the safety 
and health protection of workers  potentially at risk from  explosive atmospheres  (OJ No C 332, 
9.12.1995, p. I 0)  supplements the product-related Directive 94/9/EC on equipment and protective 
systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres on the basis of Article 118a of  the EC 
Treaty (see section 2.6.2). The Safety and Health Commission urged that the proposed Directive 
should not apply to extractive operations covered by Directives 92/91/EEC or 921104/EEC,  since 
these  Directives  already take  account of the  aims of the  proposal  and  in  some respects  indeed 
contain more stringent provisions. 
With the assistance of  the Safety and Health Commission, the European Commission is considering 
whether a directive on the protection of workers in the manufacture, storage and use of explosives 
should be drawn up  to  supplement the product-based Explosives Directive 93/15/EEC (see section 
2.6.2). The Member States are to be sounded out on their attitudes to such a proposal by means of  a 
questionnaire, which was produced towards the end of  the period covered by this report. 
2.6.2  Harmonisation of  product areas 
The  Safety and Health Commission also  played a  part in the  "approximation of the  laws of the 
Member States concerning the placing on the market of  goods" based on Article JOOa of  the Treaty. 
It took a particular interest in the proposals for the following Directives,  which in principle also 
apply to the extractive industries: 
- Directive 87/404/EEC of 25  June  1987 on the·harmonisation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to simple pressure vessels (OJ No L 220, 8.8.1987, p. 48) 
- Directive 89/392/EEC of 14 June 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to machinery (OJ No L 183, 29.6.1989, p. 9) 
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• - Directive 89/686/EEC of 21  December 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to personal protective equipment (OJ No L 399, 30.12.1989, p.  18) 
- Directive  9!/368/EEC of 20  June  1991  amending  Directive  89/392/EEC  on machinery  (OJ 
NoL !98, 22.7.!99l,p.l6) 
- Directive 93/15/EEC of 5  April  1993  on the  harmonisation of the  provisions  relating to the 
placing on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses (OJ No L 121, 15.5.1993, p. 
20) 
- Directive 93/44/EEC of 14 June 1993 amending Directive 89/392/EEC on the approximatiom of 
the laws of  the member states relating to machinery (OJ No L 175, 19.7.1993, p. 12) 
- Directive 94/9/EC of 23  March 1994 on the approximation of the laws of the  Member States 
concerning  equipment  and  protective  systems  intended  for  use  in  potentially  explosive 
atmospheres (OJ No L 100, 19.4.1994, p. 1). 
The  Machinery  Directive  89/392/EEC  is  particularly  broad  in  scope.  It is  based  on a  general 
definition of  the term "machinery" and includes complex installations. Manufacturers are required to 
certifY that the machinery complies with the basic safety requirements. For certain machinery which 
represents a  greater potential hazard,  EC  type testing is prescribed.  In the course of the  period 
covered by this report, the Machinery Directive was amended twice. The main effect of Directive 
91/368/EEC was to introduce additional essential requirements for protection against hazards arising 
from  the  movement of machinery or the  lifting of loads. The amending Directive 93/44/EEC is 
primarily concerned with the avoidance of hazards involved in vertical transport of persons. The 
Machinery  Directive  with  its  additions  applies  to  most  of the  machinery  used  in  minerals 
exploration, extraction and preparation. This applies not only to the usual surface and underground 
winning machines, transport equipment and installations and preparation plant but also to heavy 
opencast plant and hydraulic powered supports. The proposal that shaft winders should be included 
within its area of  application did not attract a majority in the Council. 
Directive 89/686/EEC contains essential requirements for the design and manufacture of personal 
protective  equipment  and  lays  down  the  conditions  for  placing  it  on  the  market and  for  free 
movement.  All  simple  personal  protective  equipment  is  exempted  from  EC  type  testing  in 
connection with EC quality assurance. 
Explosives for civil uses were brought within the ambit of harmonisation by Directive 93/15/EEC. 
The definition for  such substances is  based on international rules for  the transport of dangerous 
goods. Explosives within the meaning of  the Directive may be placed on the market if they comply 
with all requirements of the Directive, are provided with a special marking and have undergone a 
conformity assessment. An authorisation is required for transfer.  • 
Directive  94/9/EC  applies  to  equipment  and protective  systems  intended  for  use  in  potomtially 
explosive atmospheres, and covers both electrical and mechanical explosion protection. Since the 
dangers, protective measures and test methods are often very similar or indeed identical in surface 
and  underground  installations,  the Directive  covers both  fields.  Equipment  intended  for  use  in 
underground parts of mines, and in those parts of surface installations of such mines, liable to be 
endangered by firedamp  and/or combustible  dust  constitutes  group  I,  which is  subdivided into 
categories M  I  and M 2.  The conformity assessment procedures depend on the degree of risk to 
which  an  item of equipment may give rise  and/or the  degree  of risk against which a  device is 
i•1tended  to  protect  the  immediate  sunoundi•·g>.  Directive  94/9/EC  will  replace  Directive 
g2n 30/FEC  on  e1ectrica1  equipment  for  use  in  potentially  ,explosive  atmospheres  in  mines 
susceptible to firedamp not later than I July 2003. 
13  •• The  proposal  for  a  Directive  on pressure  equipment  (OJ  NoC 246,  9.9.1993,  p. I;  No C 207, 
27.7.1994, p. 5) had major implications for  the extractive industries!. Its  scc;~pe iRcludes prt.'SS\.We 
eE~~~ip!llletlt and ~es  - several pieces of  pressure equipmest assemble<;!  by a l1lftllu¥ai.:turer to 
constitute an integrated and functional whole~  with a maximum allowable press11re in ex.cess ef  0.5 
bar. The  Sarety  and Health Commission therefoce  sought  to  ensure  that  account was taken of 
conditions in mineral extraction. In the course of  the consultations, special rules were introduced for 
various items of  plant used in the extractive industries. 
2.6.3  Otherareas 
The Safety and Health Commission vigorously opposed the  European Commission's intention to  • 
include the extractive industries within the scope of  the revised Directive 82/501/EEC (the "Seveso 
Directive"), since it feared overlapping and misinterpretation as regards the safety and health of 
workers and felt that Community directives- in particular Directives 89/391/EEC, 92/91/EEC and 
92/104/EEC- together with extensive and more comprehensive rules in the Member States provided 
full regulation of  safety and health protection for workers in the extractive industries and hence also 
of  protection for the surrounding areas. 
The Safety and Health Commission also scrutinised a draft Directive on the approximation of the 
laws of  the Member States relating to the measures to be taken against the emission of  gaseous and 
particulate  pollutants  from  internal  combustion  engines  to  be  installed  in  non-road  mobile 
machinery. The proposal was published as document COM/95/350 final. The Directive's scope is 
intended to include underground and surface workings in the extractive industries. The Safety and 
Health Commission sought arrangements which took account of conditions in these industries and 
avoided restricting the Member States' scope for enacting more stringent legislation consistent with 
the EC Treaty for the protection of  workers during the use of  such machinery and equipment 
2.7  Events 
The Safety and Health Commission also endeavoured to highlight the importance of safety and 
health protection for the extractive industries by organising various events. Improvement of safety 
and health conditions at work was promoted by special campaigns.  The exchange of ideas and 
experience  and  the  rapid  dissemination  of new  knowledge  were  encouraged  by  means  of 
conferences and symposia, a workshop and a congress. 
2. 7.1  Safety campaigning activities 
The Safety and Health Commission has long sought to promote "safety campaigns" in the Member 
States to foster safety and health protection and has secured funding  for several of these activities 
from the European Commission budget virtually every year. The safety campaigns were geared to 
the conditions and risks encountered in specific regions and/or branches of the extractive industries. 
Preference was given to topics which were of  current interest or were important for the area or type 
of operation  in  question,  relating  to  both  surface  and  underground  workings  and  borehole 
operations. The Safety and Health Commission increasingly sought to involve small and medium-
sized finns in these activities. 
Mention should he made of  a major European venture in which the Safety and Health Commission 
played a part. Under the aegis of  the European Commission, the European  Year of Safety, Hygiene 
and Health Protection at Work was held between I March 1992 and 28 February 1993. As high-risk 
sectors, the extractive industries were among the pnority areas. The activities were organised by a 
The proposal bas since been adopted as Directive 97/23/EC (OJ No L 181, 9.7.1997, p.  I). Consideration 
will shortly be given to the possibility of  incorporating Directive 87 /404/EEC on simple pressure vessels. 
14-central committee in Luxembourg and national liaison committees. The importance of safety and 
health protection was highlighted in many different ways, e.g. by the opening ceremony in Lisbon, 
the final conference in Copenhagen, a film festival, various national events, information campaigns 
in the public domain and in  industry and selected television programmes.  The Safety and Health 
Commission proposed that the European Commission provide financial support for the making of a 
number of  films on specific safety and health topics in the extractive industries. 
2.7.2  Conferences 
The Safety and Health Commission organised periodic conferences  for  workers in the  extractive 
industries. One such conference was held on 30 September and I October 1985 ifi Luxembourt! ..d 
another  on 25-26 June  1990  in  Madrid.  They  allowed  a  large  number of worblrs  lo become 
acquainted  with  the  mission,  working  methods  and  achievementz  of the  Safety  and  H•lth 
Commission, the European Commission's safety and health goals and acti0r1  and new fiadings of 
practical relevance from European research projects. They also obtained an im;i&ht into the nature 
and structure of  the extractive industries and the current status of  safety and health protectior1 in the 
host country and/or a neighbouring country. 
2. 7.3  SyrttpOSia 
In the report period, four sympozia were held in Luxembourg, dealinc with itwpolilnt llfld  topical 
questions in various fields. 
2.7.3.1  Safety and health in diving operations 
As  offshore  activities  have  expanded,  subsea  work  has  become  incream&ly  iftlpOrlant.  New 
methods and equipment have raised new safety or medical issues. In onler to aHow the k:ey upectl 
to  be  diiCUNOd  befoce  a  wide  audience,  the  Safety and Health CommiNion,  topCber  with the 
European Diving Technology Committee (EDTC), held an international 1~  on afety and 
health in diving operations on 7-S May 1985. The papers read dealt with dutie. w  ~lities, 
documentation, plant and equipment, training, safety in diving work, divin:; modiciM and JUidelinea 
for establishmertt of qi1lation. Since the mid-1980s, there has been a cle« dnJp ia fatal accident 
rates. In order to take account of further developments, especially in methoM, workina; teebniques 
and equipmmt, ~~afety technolocy and medicine, a follow-up workshop was helcl in LWUIIllbour!l on 
13-15 Aprill994. Some oftbe topics discussed were complementary to the 191511'}'ft1POI!Nm, 
2.7.3.2  Safety ad  lwalth in the other-than-coal mining and quarryina industriM 
At the international symposium on safety and health in the mining and quarryinf; industries on lO-
ll September 19M, the current status of  safety and health wock in these activitils W1M! llot!eri'bed and 
ways of improvinc; safety and health identified. The subjects  cover~ iocludlld Wl'll!'kinc  me1:hod1l, 
ways of  r0duoinc accident risks in quarries and new aafety developme!lta in the odwr-1iuln.-1 <ieep 
mining iodustries. Other Jltlpers  emphasised the importance of tramina for  Sllfety  an4 health and 
discusaed worker involvement in safety and the role of  the inspectocDis. 
2.7.3.3  Explosion and fire risks in auxiliary-ventilated workings 
The symposium on explosion risks in auxiliary-ventilated workings on 17 September 1985  was a 
response by the Safety and Health Commission to the Simon Colliery disaster on 25 February 1985 
(see section 2.2.1) and to vari0us resolutions of the European Parliament. These had called on the 
Safety and Health CoLee:,;,,;. " ;., J:•ke aclion within the terms of its remit to analyse tit e. ~es  artd 
to work towards  i~~tprove~t-el\.tS, Alllve sy:::posium, a consensus emerged on what Wolfo: ~~~~~~ lie 
done md he>w ii  slw,l\14 'Jl'ICCtd. A  :[~!.  1~tok. WIIS tD  be taken at the safety of auxiliary vuti'lttl.ion, 
limiting of  lhe danger~ ~f  el<jllosiD», lnll4$ill'eS bo improve ;;•·:'ention and fighting of ll\ll!e fi'Je.S II!¥ 
to  improve protection ci pEI'>i:lllt.d  4lld  U!e.  i" Fluelllte  of ll<liiW'I  factors.  The  work  1IOOS  i:o  ~e 
15  --account oflessons learned from various other explosions in which auxiliary ventilation had played a 
part. 
Tbe  symposium on &-7 December 1990 on "Measures to reduce the  explosion and  fire  risk m 
auxiliary-ventilated workings and to improve the protection of  personnel in the event of explosions 
and fires in coal mines" centred on Doc. No 5147/89 (see section 2.3.1.4). This text dealt in detail 
with the subjects agreed upon at  the  symposium on 17 September  1985.  The  substantial  report 
produced by the Safety and Health Commission was presented to a large number of  representatives 
of t'1e  governments and inspectorates in the Member States, employers and employees, staff from 
scientific establislnnents and testing laboratories and academics. The discussion confirmed that the 
explosion  and fire  risk in coal  mines  could be reduced and workers'  safety  increased by  new 
measures, methods and equipment. Papers were also presented on the outcome of the inquiry into a 
major fire in  a  London underground station and on the  drivage  of the  Channel  Tunnel.  These 
revealed similarities between mining and other sectors. 
2.7.4  Workshop 
The explosion protection workshop held Qn  27 November  1995  in Luxembourg  followed up the 
symposium of &-7 December 1990. The aim was to establish whether the lessons emerging from 
some recent explosions made it desirable to add to Doc. No 5147/89 on the explosion and fire risk in 
auxiliary ventilation and workforce protection. There was detailed discussion of  the explosion at San 
Nicolas Colliery (Spain), the explosion at Haus Aden Colliery (Germany) (see section 2.2.1) and the 
triggered barriers which had been developed in the course of 25  years of research. The debate 
revealed several areas in which there seemed to be reason to update Doc. No 5147/89. The main 
topics to be investigated are the firedamp hazard in blind-end workings, deep/extended cut methods, 
various questions in connection with dueling, problems in the use of self-rescuers, ventilation of 
roof  cavities, possible modes of  frictional ignition and active (triggered) barriers. 
2. 7.5  Congress 
On 28-29 April 1994, a congress on "Forty years of Community work on safety and health in the 
extractive and steel industries" was held in Luxembourg.  Some of the  prominent speakers were 
H. McCubbin (MEP), G. Porrazzini (MEP) and M.A. Garcia Loygorri, of the  ECSC Consultative 
Committee. 
The Safety and Health Commission played a  major part in preparing and shaping this congress, 
although a great deal of ground was covered in addition to the SHCMOEI's functions. The first part 
focused on safety and health protection at work. The European approach to improving occupational 
safety and health in underground and surface workings and borehole operations was discussed in 
detail. Other papers dealt with specific questions such as explosion barriers and specifications and 
testing conditions for  fire-resistant hydraulic fluids. The first part concluded with a report on the 
work of  the Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission. 
The second part of  the congress provided a good overall picture of the ECSC research programmes 
and their results. Brief accounts were given of the programmes on pollution in the iron and steel 
industry,  industrial  hygiene  in  mines,  medical  research  and  ergonomics.  General  regret  was 
expressed at the filet that they were being wound up. 
2. 7. 6  Other information activities 
Members of the Safety and Health Commission secretariat took part in  many events arranged by 
other bodies in the Member States and non-Community countries, and reported on the work of the 
Safety and Health Commission and the European Commission. 
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• There were  also  many  visits  by  groups  or  individuals  with an  interest in  the  Safety and Health 
Commission's work. 
Particular  significance  attaches  to  visits  by  representatives  of government  departments  and 
employees' and employers' organisations from  the  new Member States, who both before and after 
the accession of their countries to the European Union acquainted themselves with the  safety and 
health work of  the European Commission and its associated bodies, including the Safety and Health 
Commission. 
Members  of the  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and  its  Committees  and  Working  Parties  also 
disseminated information to the audiences concerned within their own countries. 
2.8  Co-operation with other institutions, committees and bodies 
.  In the reporting period, the Safety and Health Commission maintained close relations with various 
European and international organisations, in particular with the following bodies. 
2.8.1  ECSC research committees 
Under  the  terms  of its  remit,  the  Safety  and  Health  Commission  collaborated  with  the  ECSC 
research committees in proposing various research projects to improve safety and health in mining. 
It also  played  a  part  in  the  exploitation of the  research  results  and  contributed  greatly  to  the 
application of new  knowledge  in  practice.  Major  concerns  of the  safety  programmes  were  the 
prevention,  detection  and  combating  of open and  deep-seated  mine  fires  and  the  initiation  and 
propagation of explosions, together with their prevention and ways of limiting their effects. New 
strategies were developed for mines rescue and individual aspects such as location, communications 
and  self-rescuers  were  improved.  Other  projects  addressed  the  prediction  and  prevention  of 
rockbursts  and  gas  outbursts  and  the  introduction  and  dissemination  of modern  techniques  for 
monitoring, remote control and automation. The programmes on health protection at work included, 
e.g. projects on fibrogenic mineral dusts, noise, vibration and diesel exhaust and their control. 
2.8.2  European standardisation 
The  drive  towards  technical  harmonisation  within  the  European  Community,  which  also 
encompasses the extractive industries, has made it necessary for the Safety and Health Commission 
to  become involved in  the work of the  European  standardisation bodies CEN and CENELEC.  In 
product-related  directives  under  the  old  approach,  harmonised  standards  are  often  important 
elements  in  the  instruments  themselves  while  for  new  approach  directives  they  give  practical 
expression to the essential safety and health requirements. An example of the traditional approach to 
harmonisation  is  Directive  82/130/EEC on  the  approximation of the  laws  of the  Member States 
concerning electrical equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres in mines susceptible to 
firedamp. The Safety and Health Commission and its secretariat monitored the standardisation work 
in connection with this Directive and the more recent directives listed in section 2.6.2 for conformity 
with their aims, departures and overlap. In several cases, the European standardisation bodies used 
the results of  work by the Safety and Health Commission in order to produce general standards. This 
applies  e.g.  to  self-rescuers,  methanometers,  explosimeters  and  test  methods  for  fire-resistant 
conveyor belts.  The  Safety and Health Commission  secretariat was. also  directly  involved  in  the 
revision of CEN standards in the field of explosion protection and was  assisted in this task by the 
Safety and Health Commission itself and its Working Parties. The Safety and Health Commission's 
requirements and tests for fire-resistant hydraulic fluids are shortly to be taken over by the CEN in 
harmonised standards. 
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The  Safety and Health Commission maintained close links with the European Diving Technology 
Committee. Underwater work is an area of rapid technological progress. It was therefore necessary 
to exchange information frequently on the implications of  changes in methods and equipment for the 
safety and health of  divers. 
2.8.4  Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work 
Since 1994, the Safety and Health Commission and the Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and 
Health  Protection  at  Work  have  exchanged  observers,  government,  employer  and  employee 
representatives  being  invited  to  attend  the  plenary  meetings  of the  other body.  This  practice  is 
intended  to  make  the  two  bodies  more  familiar  with  each  other's  structure,  goals  and  working 
methods and to reveal any overlap in their missions and activities. Experience to date indicates that 
while the two bodies do  have  various points in  common,  they work in  different ways and do  not 
really perform similar functions. 
2.8.5  The European Agency 
The  European  Agency  for  Safety  and  Health  at  Work  was  established  by  Council  Regulation 
No2062/94 of 18  July  1994 (OJNoL216, 20.8.1994, p.l). Its aim is  to  provide the Community 
bodies, the Member States and those involved in the field with the technical, scientific and economic 
information of use in the field of  safety and health at work. The Administrative Board consists of  48 
members, comprising representatives of the governments, employers, employees and the European 
Commission (Regulation No 1643/95 of 29 June  1995- OJ No L 156, 7.7.1995, p.  I). The  Safety 
and Health Commission took a close interest in the establishment of the Agency and is keen to co-
operate with it. Given its competence and experience, it regards itself as the most suitable European 
body to  assist  the  Agency  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  the  safety  and  health of workers  in  the 
extractive industries. 
2. 8. 6  International Labour Organisation 
There  are  many  links  between the  International  Labour Organisation  and the  Safety  and  Health 
Commission and this is reflected in the routine presence of  an ILO observer at plenary meetings of 
the  Safety and Health Commission. During the report period, particular importance attached to  the 
work of the  ILO  on  safety  and  health  in  mines.  In  preparation for  a discussion of this  topic  in 
Conference, the ILO sent out various documents, including a questionnaire. This was based on the 
Community  Directive  92/1 04/EEC  on  the  minimum requirements  for  improving  the  safety  and 
health protection of workers in surface and underground mineral-extracting industries and  formed 
the basis for the Convention subsequently adopted. It was completed not only by the Member States 
of the European Union but also at Community level. The Community's response was drafted by the 
European Commission with assistance from the Safety and Health Commission and was scrutinised 
and amended by the Council social affairs working party. The  final  version was forwarded by the 
Council.  Convention  176  concerning  Safety  and  Health  in  Mines  and  the  accompanying 
Recommendation  183  were  adopted  by  the  General  Conference  of the  International  Labour 
Organisation on 22 June  1995.  The  Safety and Health Commission is closely monitoring progress 
towards ratifying this Convention in the Member States. 
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• 2.9  Improvements in organisation and working methods 
In  1993, the Safety and Health Commission took an important decision in order to be able to work 
even more effectively than before within the given administrative and financial constraints. The 12 
Working  Parties  then  in  existence  were  reduced  to1five  Committees:  Underground  Workings, 
Surface  Workings,  Borehole Operations,  Health Protection,  Human  Factors.  Terms  of reference 
were handed down to these Committees and their chairmen and deputy chairmen were chosen from 
among the members of  the Restricted Committee, which took on the role of  a steering committee. 
2.10  Future work 
1n future years, the Safety and Health Commission intends to produce a number of proposals to the 
governments of the Member States. These  include recommendations and reports on principles of 
strata control and support in deep  other-than-coal mines,  reduction of fire  and explosion risks  in 
deep mines and in oil and gas extraction, control of transport-related hazards in opencast mines and 
quarries, reduction of  risks to health resulting from diesel exhaust emissions, especially in confined 
spaces, and workplace risk assessment (Doc. No 5245/3/94). It is also proposed to look into ways of 
preventing accidents and occupational illnesses by taking better account of  human factors. 
The Safety and Health Commission will continue to support the European Commission in its efforts 
to improve safety and health in the extractive industries, particularly stressing constructive dialogue 
on transposal of  Community directives into national law and their implementation. 
3.  PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
For almost 40 years, the  Safety and Health Commission has made  a sustained effort to  improve 
workers'  safety  and  health  and  operational  safety  in  the  extractive  industries  by  technical  and 
organisational  measures  and,  to  an  increasing extent,  by considerat,ion  for  human  factors.  It has 
many positive achievements to its credit and this is reflected e.g. in the decline of  accident rl\tes and 
the incidence of  typical occupational diseases and in the more acceptable conditions obtaining at the 
workplace. 
The  Safety  and  Health  Commission  has  repeatedly  demonstrated  its  ability  to  match  its  work 
programme to current safety and health needs and to  work towards practicable solutions within a 
reasonable time frame. It is better placed to  do  this than any other European forum because of its 
technical  competence and  experience of the  extractive  industries  and  its  composition.  A  viable 
secretariat is  essential if the  work is  to  remain abreast of current  developments.  The  Safety and· 
Health Commission will  also seek ways of adapting its  organisation and working methods  to  an 
enlarged European Union. 
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